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ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday 5 April 1963, at 10.30. a.m.

Chairman

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

63-12983

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KUPKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. M. STAHL

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J. K. WRIGHT

Mr. R. C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE

Mr. A. L. RICHARDS

Mr. D. E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the one hundred and eighteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation was very pleased when, after months of deadlock over the agenda of the Committee of the Whole, the co-Chairmen were able to agree (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) that one plenary meeting a week would be reserved for considering collateral measures. We held the first of those meetings last Friday. I said at the meeting on 18 March (ENDC/PV.110, p.48) that my delegation hoped that a common interest in particular items would emerge in the course of those Friday discussions. The Committee would then be able to select items which offered the best hope of agreement.

It is obvious that the arrangement agreed upon by the co-Chairmen is only relatively useful, as a temporary procedure offering a way out of the previous impasse. My delegation would prefer that this discussion should take place in the Committee of the Whole, which was created by the Conference for the purpose. We hope that that will soon be possible on the basis of an agreed agenda. It would make it possible for plenary meetings to be devoted to our most urgent task — the conclusion of an agreement to end all nuclear weapon tests. The Canadian delegation is, of course, convinced that that task — the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests — must continue to receive the highest priority in our discussions.

After eight months of inactivity in the field of collateral measures we might remind ourselves of the background of our discussions on the subject and of what we are trying to achieve. The joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5), endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, provides in its paragraph 8 that the negotiating States should seek to achieve and implement measures which would facilitate a programme for general and complete disarmament. At its last session the General Assembly recommended, in resolution 1767(XVII), that

"urgent attention should be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/64)

When this Conference began on 14 March 1962 all the delegations here fully recognized the importance and urgency of reaching early agreement on measures collateral to disarmament. On 28 March, almost immediately after the Conference was

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established, the Committee of the Whole held its first meeting (ENDC/C.1/PV.1); and thereafter intensive discussions took place in that Committee and in meetings of the co-Chairmen on the first agreed item of the agenda. Now, one year later, the importance of collateral measures has in no way diminished. We think that, on the contrary, it has increased, and that is because it has become clearer to all of us how great are the problems of general and complete disarmament which remain to be resolved. We all realize now that general and complete disarmament can only be built on a foundation of mutual confidence between the great Powers. Notwithstanding the fact that some progress has been achieved, our discussions on general and complete disarmament have had, and continue to have, an atmosphere of abstraction, of philosophical speculation about contingencies in the remote future, unless and until an agreement is reached on a nuclear test ban and an increased measure of international confidence is created through agreement on measures collateral to general and complete disarmament.

The conclusion I draw is that, in order to make progress towards our goal of general and complete disarmament, we must now concentrate our efforts on those areas where agreement can be reached at an early date and can come into force prior to agreement on a programme for total disarmament. The Canadian delegation is convinced that our task of achieving general and complete disarmament would not only be made easier by agreement on a test ban and on collateral measures; it would be transformed by the new confidence which would be created by such agreements.

Later on I intend to make a statement on the proposal (ENDC/17) which my delegation put forward earlier in this Conference for a declaration prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. In the opinion of the Canadian delegation, agreement on that collateral measure would be a really important forward step because, like an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, it would help to halt the development of new types of weapons. At one of our future meetings I shall also offer some comments on the proposal of the Soviet Union that we adopt a declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75).

I should like now to make a few general remarks on the proposals of the United States concerning measures for the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication (ENDC/70). It will be recalled that the

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co-Chairmen recommended in document ENDC/C.1/19 of 25 May 1962 that the collateral measures Committee should consider concurrently proposals by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union accepted for discussion as a collateral measure the United States proposal of which I am speaking. We are all well aware that, subsequent to that agreement, differences arose about the inclusion of other matters on the agenda of the collateral measures Committee, which had the result of blocking the convening of that Committee. However, it is my understanding that the Soviet delegation still agrees that this subject should be an item for discussion on the agenda of the collateral measures Committee.

I should also like to draw to the Committee's attention that the Soviet Union itself proposed, in a memorandum (A/4892, pp.9-10) submitted to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Gromyko on 26 September 1961, that steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack should be agreed upon and implemented prior to the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Such a measure was described by Mr. Gromyko in his memorandum as one which would contribute to the easing of international tension and the strengthening of confidence among States. Further, the fact that substantive provisions on preventing war by accident contained in the Soviet plan are now very similar to those contained in the United States plan shows that the Soviet Union recognizes the positive value of implementing measures of this kind.

Mr. Tsarapkin, at the plenary meeting on 26 November 1962, said:

"The Soviet Government deemed it possible to accept some of the United States' proposals for reducing the danger of outbreak of war. The Soviet Union agreed, in particular, with such measures proposed by the United States for the first stage of disarmament as the exchange of military missions between States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding, and the establishment of swift and reliable communication between Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"As regards the United States proposal for advance notification of substantial military movements or manoeuvres within the national territories of States, the Soviet Union not only accepted that proposal but also deemed it necessary to go further in that respect by putting forward a proposal for the prohibition, in stage I, of substantial joint military movements and manoeuvres with the participation of the armed forces of two or more States."

(ENDC/PV.83, p.24)

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Mr. Tsarapkin's statement must mean that there are no substantial differences between the two sides on the real merits of three of the measures proposed by the United States -- advance notification, exchange of military missions and establishment of reliable communications between Heads of Government. I was, therefore, surprised when Mr. Tsarapkin said on 20 March -- and Mr. Stelle quoted this at our meeting on Friday last (ENDC/PV.115, p.14) -- that measures concerning reduction of the risk of war would "... acquire definite significance only if carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Taken by themselves, in isolation from disarmament measures, they would not only be useless but, what is more, they could be turned against the security interests of particular States." (ENDC/PV.111, p.29)

The Cuban crisis last autumn proved beyond doubt the value of rapid, dependable and direct communications. The importance of providing advance notification of large-scale manoeuvres is self-evident. Such a measure would help to avoid misinterpreting the significance of military movements connected with such exercises and would increase mutual confidence in an area where it is very much needed. An exchange of military missions between States or groups of States would, as the Soviet plan itself recognizes, improve relations and mutual understanding. Direct contacts between responsible military men would help to remove doubts and fears and, if initiated in a spirit of frankness and co-operation, could produce results far beyond those immediately expected. The value of those direct exchanges would of course depend largely on the precise arrangements to be worked out.

My delegation cannot understand why the Soviet delegation considers that the measures which I have just mentioned would be useful and feasible only if the process of general and complete disarmament had begun. It seems to us that the strong interest of the Soviet Union in having a non-aggression pact now -- immediately -- should make it welcome the putting into effect as soon as possible of concrete measures which could help to clarify situations and provide assurances about the peaceful intentions of other States. That would be an immediate and substantial contribution towards the maintenance of international peace.

In his statement on 20 March, from which I have already quoted, Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the possible effect of those measures on the security of States. At our meeting on 29 March the representative of the United States said:

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"... I wish to assure the Soviet delegation that the United States Government is not interested in leading the Soviet Union to enter into any agreement in this field that the Soviet Union is not convinced will lessen ~~risks~~ of war and increase confidence, for that would be directly contrary to the purpose of our efforts." (ENDC/PV.115, p.14)

Later Mr. Stelle said that the United States proposals on notification of military movements, a direct communications link and an exchange of military missions, were "... designed primarily not to impose obligations on a 'host country' but to afford it opportunities to utilize the arrangement for purposes of clarification and reassurance." (ibid., p.16)

It is clear that the measures we are discussing are for the benefit of the country using the arrangements as well as of the other States concerned. They will be used by the so-called host country only as it considers it in its interest to use them. It follows that the States negotiating the arrangements will ensure that procedures are so drawn up as fully to protect their security. So concern about security should not be an obstacle to a mutually satisfactory agreement.

To sum up, I wish to associate the Canadian delegation with those delegations which, at an earlier stage of our discussions, welcomed the United States working paper (ENDC/70) of 12 December 1962 on this subject. We believe that that document explains the essentials of the proposal, and we hope that agreement can be reached on it in the near future.

The Canadian delegation recognizes that, within the general scope of this subject, measures have been proposed by both the Soviet Union and the United States which are not so far acceptable to the other side. For example, the Soviet proposal for the prohibition of large-scale joint military movements of armed forces of two or more States (ENDC/2.Rev.1. Art.17(A)) is not acceptable to the West, for reasons which have already been explained in this Conference by Western delegations. However, the fact that there are proposals of one side which do not commend themselves to the other should not, in our view, prevent agreement on implementing those measures which are acceptable to both sides.

In that connexion I should like to quote from the joint statement of agreed principles one particular sentence which seems to be directly applicable. Paragraph 8 reads, in part:

"States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date." (ENDC/5, p.3)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The implication for our work seems to be that where it is possible to achieve a certain measure of agreement the negotiating parties should seek to implement it without waiting for the settlement of the remaining differences in related areas. It is our earnest hope that the co-Chairmen will enter into negotiations on this subject as soon as possible.

The Canadian delegation is convinced that an agreement would be welcomed by the entire world. It would help to reduce the fears of all of us of the possibility of a nuclear holocaust resulting from a mistake or an accident; it would show the world that the major Powers were determined to ease international tensions; it would create confidence that the Eighteen-Nation Committee could accomplish the tasks before it.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): Today the Eighteen-Nation Committee is continuing the discussion of partial disarmament measures. The Polish delegation understands that the discussion will develop, as it were, in two stages. In the first stage, all delegations should have an opportunity of expressing their views on the various proposals submitted for our attention. We hope that once the preliminary stage is concluded the Committee will adopt an agenda which will enable us to start real negotiations.

Involved as we are in a discussion on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and general and complete disarmament, we tend sometimes to overlook the importance of partial measures. Yet the contribution which the adoption of such measures could make to the solution of more general problems cannot be overestimated; but they must fulfil certain conditions, and in particular contain elements of real disarmament -- in other words, they must reduce the war potential of States, or at least remove its offensive character. But that is not all: they must also contain the elements of political solutions calculated to reduce international tension, increase trust between States and expedite the conclusion of more fundamental agreements.

That is the basis of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, and in particular of the draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77) as also of the Polish delegation's proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1).

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I should like to confine my statement today to a few general observations on the draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and on the Polish proposal for the denuclearization of central Europe. I reserve the right to revert to the subject of the non-aggression pact on a later occasion.

The present international situation calls for urgent measures calculated to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. Among the causes of that risk is the presence in many countries of United States military bases equipped with offensive nuclear weapons. The retention of these bases is not warranted by any legitimate defence need; nor is it reconcilable with the principles which should govern normal peace-time relations between States. Advance bases close to the frontiers of socialist countries are a threat to the security of the States concerned. They are the main reason for the distrust now marking East-West relations.

The risk of nuclear war has recently been aggravated by the Western Powers' policy of proliferating nuclear weapons. This trend takes various forms and is no longer confined to the transfer of nuclear weapons. It is also reflected in the introduction of various forms of joint responsibility for these weapons, for instance in the right to participate in the control and utilization of these weapons, on which the United States plans for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force would appear to be founded.

The Polish delegation does not consider that the creation of this multilateral force has anything to do with the avowed purpose of basing relations within the Atlantic alliance on equality among its members. We are, on the contrary, convinced that this concept serves the ambitions of the most bellicose elements in that Alliance, and especially militarist circles in West Germany, and that its realization will help to subordinate the Alliance to their will. It was not by chance that Mr. von Hassel, the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, boasted that the idea of a multilateral nuclear force is in fact a German invention. Nor is it pure coincidence that the only country which accepts without demur the various alternatives for the multilateral force, provided only that it becomes a reality without delay, is Federal Germany. The German militarists are very well aware that the multilateral force is only a beginning. Has not Chancellor Adenauer already stated that vessels equipped with Polaris missiles are not sufficient and that the multilateral force must be equipped with intermediate-range missiles based on Europe?

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The question is still being asked in the West whether the creation of a multilateral force is tantamount to Federal Germany's admission to the nuclear club. Some say it will be admission only to the ante-room. But it is generally agreed that, whatever the situation may be today, full membership for West Germany cannot be long delayed; for such is the logical sequence of events set in motion by the Western Powers.

Hence, contrary to the statements we have often heard in this Committee from the representatives of the Western Powers, the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force will help to spread nuclear weapons, and put them in the hands of those whose policy is based on the ideas of revenge and of the revision of the frontiers established after the last World War.

The Polish delegation considers that all appropriate measures must be taken to check the development of these trends and to lessen the concomitant dangers. We believe that the adoption of the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union would help us to achieve that objective.

During discussions round this table, some Western delegations have again attempted to question the soundness of the Soviet proposal. I refer, in particular, to the speech last Friday by Mr. Godber (ENDC/PV.115), the United Kingdom representative, who maintained that the Soviet draft declaration should be rejected, first, because its implementation would destroy the East-West balance of forces in favour of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty; secondly, because the declaration is contrary to present Western policy, which is designed to reduce the risks of war by accident, and, thirdly, because it entails unilateral concessions by members of NATO unmatched by any adequate return.

I venture to make a few comments on these three arguments.

It is noteworthy that the representatives of the Western Powers have got into the habit of using the balance-of-forces argument whenever the socialist countries propose the adoption of some disarmament measure. The balance of forces has become an easy and convenient general-purpose argument brought up to justify objections to our suggestions. It is also noteworthy that the Western representatives have never attempted to explain what they regard as the elements of this balance and how, in their view, the balance should be evaluated. They seek refuge from the difficulties entailed in defining this balance behind a, to me, rather question-begging argument which might be summed up

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as follows: The premise that world peace depends on the balance of forces between the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty and those of the Warsaw Treaty is taken as axiomatic, requiring no proof; the conclusion from the fact that peace is maintained is that a balance of forces exists. Pursuing this line of reasoning, it might be maintained that the armaments race is a factor for peace and that any military action that leaves peace intact is not only justifiable but beneficial.

Obviously, no better doctrine could be imagined to justify the armaments race and the policy of preparation for war. By virtue of that doctrine, any proposal by the Soviet Union becomes an attempt to disturb the balance of forces, whereas everything the West does, militarily or politically, consolidates the balance. Thus, according to Mr. Godber, the creation by the Western Powers, who already possess a network of military bases round the frontiers of the socialist countries, of a submarine nuclear force to plough the seas near our shores would leave the balance intact. He would even have us believe that there would be no change in the present strategic and political situations if other countries, including Western Germany, were to acquire nuclear arms.

We do not underestimate the importance of the principle that disarmament measures should at no stage give any party an advantage. But we do not believe that the criteria applied by the Western Powers in assessing a disarmament measure comply with that principle, any more than we believe that such a measure can be judged by exclusively military criteria. If the solution of the disarmament problem were to be left to the strategists, we could be sure of achieving no result.

The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, devoted a considerable part of his speech to proving that the military measures the West is proposing to take reduce the risk of war by accident. In his view, this applies particularly to plans for the creation of a submarine fleet equipped with Polaris missiles, which would be supplied to the new NATO multilateral force. We have already had occasion to express our views on this subject. But I should like to emphasize two points. The invulnerability of a force and its defensive character are not synonymous. The character of a force is determined by the policy it has been designed to serve; and the participation of Western Germany in this multilateral force is far from reassuring for us. Submarines equipped with Polaris missiles can very well be used for a surprise attack on the

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socialist countries. Nor can we disregard the fact that increasing the number of countries entitled to "co-decide" on the use of nuclear weapons -- increasing the number of "fingers on the trigger" -- simultaneously increases the chances of a war starting by accident, miscalculation, failure of communication, or a premeditated act of provocation.

Mr. Godber claims that the creation of a NATO invulnerable nuclear force will increase general stability and reduce the danger of war. I must therefore conclude that he regards the retention of United States bases equipped with intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the Middle East -- since they are vulnerable -- as a factor of instability. So we were entitled to expect that the United Kingdom representative would warmly support proposals to eliminate these bases. But not so! Mr. Godber immediately found another reason for retaining them. He seems to think that for every missile capable of striking a target in western Europe from the territory of the Soviet Union there should be a missile stationed in western Europe capable of reaching a target in the Soviet Union. Hence the question of the vulnerability of these missiles, and all that implies, gives place to a purely arithmetical argument. Assuming the argument to be sound, the question arises how Mr. Godber can reconcile the role in the defence of western Europe he ascribes to nuclear submarines and to intercontinental missiles stationed in the United States with his own conception of balance and stability based on the invulnerability of the nuclear force.

Mr. Godber states that the Soviet Union has no nuclear submarine bases abroad. Is this a reproach? Mr. Godber notes that the Soviet Union has no aircraft carriers based on foreign territories with aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Is this also a reproach? Would this affect the significance of or the justification for the proposal contained in the declaration submitted by the Soviet delegation? The Soviet proposal is not designed to obtain unilateral concessions. Its sole aim is to find some means of easing international tension and reducing the danger of a nuclear war. After all, it must not be forgotten that the Soviet proposal refers to weapons that are pre-eminently offensive. Its adoption will in no way affect the defensive capabilities of States; their overall nuclear potential will not be impaired. There will be one change: the relocation of offensive nuclear weapons. This will of course modify their role to some extent, but the defensive power of States will suffer in no way.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The implementation of the Soviet proposal will, without a doubt, limit such possibilities of launching a surprise attack as now exist owing to the networks of United States nuclear bases and to the maintenance on continuous ocean patrol of a vast fleet equipped with nuclear missiles.

It would also permanently eliminate the chances of making surprise changes in the general strategic balance by unexpected movements of offensive nuclear weapons.

The adoption of the measures envisaged in the Soviet declaration would help to put an end to the nuclear armaments race, which is in danger of spreading to new territories, and to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, by confining the offensive nuclear potential to the territory of only a few States, it could appreciably reduce the risk of war by accident.

Finally, it should also be stressed that experience gained in implementing the Soviet proposal might be put to use in seeking broader ways and means of eliminating foreign bases within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

The draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union reflects various misgivings expressed during discussions at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. It expresses the concern felt by many delegations in face of the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It links up with the Ghanaian delegation's proposal of 9 November 1962 (A/C.1/PV.1270, p.26) to the United Nations that offensive ground-to-ground missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from the territories of foreign countries.

Our reason for dealing with the Soviet declaration in conjunction with the question of creating denuclearized zones is our conviction that these two ideas have the same apprehensions behind them. Like the measures proposed in the Soviet draft declaration, the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world would help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the risk of a nuclear war.

The idea of denuclearizing certain zones is not new. It has found expression in various proposals for denuclearized zones in central Europe, in the Balkans, in the Far East, in Africa and in Latin America. The idea of denuclearization was incorporated in the Antarctic Treaty signed in December 1959. It was taken up by the United Nations General Assembly, which in December 1961 adopted almost unanimously a resolution recognizing the African continent as a denuclearized region (A/RES/1652(XVI)).

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

It is not without interest that the idea of creating denuclearized zones and opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons are winning more and more support in the United Nations. It emerged, for instance, from discussions at the last session of the General Assembly that an increasing number of Member States regard denuclearization as an effective means of ensuring peace in certain regions of the world. In that connexion mention need only be made of the proposals for a denuclearized zone in Latin America. This idea has been most valuably and considerably helped forward by the well-known efforts of the Irish and Swedish delegations.

We also note certain changes in the attitude of the Western Powers. They apparently no longer reject, as in the past, the idea of regional disarmament arrangements, though they sometimes make their agreement subject to preliminary conditions that are at variance with the end pursued. We think the time has come for this Committee to discuss the substance of the question. The points for discussion should be the general principles to govern the establishment of denuclearized zones, the obligations of States belonging to such a zone, and safeguards for the inviolability of the zones based on pledges by the nuclear Powers.

The adoption of general provisions governing the establishment of denuclearized zones should be the starting point for a detailed discussion on the proposal submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 28 March 1962 by the Polish delegation concerning the denuclearization of central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1).

We insist that the creation of a denuclearized zone in central Europe is still an urgent issue. That zone is of cardinal importance for the preservation of world peace. It is there that the two military groups, that is to say, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty and those of the Warsaw Treaty stand face to face. It is there that the political situation may give rise to conflicts that might well turn into a trial of nuclear strength.

The establishment of a denuclearized zone in central Europe would therefore be far more than a purely regional solution; for it would have repercussions on the general political and military situation and would certainly have beneficial effects throughout the world.

(Mr. Bluszta in, Poland)

May I remind the Committee briefly of the main provisions of the memorandum submitted by the Polish delegation on 28 March 1962 concerning the creation in Europe of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone. The aim we have in view is not only to eliminate nuclear weapons and their vehicles from the territories of the People's Republic of Poland, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, but also to reduce the armed forces and conventional armaments in these territories. We also consider that the denuclearized and limited armaments zone which we propose should not be limited to these States. The agreement concerning it should be open to any European State desirous of acceding to it. The Polish proposal provides for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in central Europe in two stages. In the first stage, the States concerned would undertake to maintain the status quo. The States belonging to the zone would, for instance, undertake to refrain from preparing to produce or actually producing any type of nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon delivery vehicle. They would also pledge themselves not to introduce any type of nuclear weapon or vehicle into their territory; nor would they authorize the establishment of any new bases or installations for stockpiling or utilizing nuclear weapons or their vehicles.

States outside the zone would undertake not to provide nuclear weapons or vehicles to States belonging to the zone. They would also be pledged not to introduce new nuclear weapons or vehicles into the zone and not to establish new bases or installations for the utilization of these weapons.

The first stage would therefore be like a preliminary period preceding the carrying-out of the plan to denuclearize the zone and to limit conventional armaments in it, which would be the second stage. Not until completion of the second stage of the Polish plan would the territories of the States in the zone be cleared of all nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and all bases and installations for stockpiling or utilizing such weapons. At the same time, the armed forces and armaments of the States belonging to the zone would be reduced to an agreed level. The armed forces and the armaments of other States stationed in the territory of the zone would likewise be reduced to an agreed level.

The Polish plan provides for a system of international control and inspection to ensure that the denuclearization and disarmament measures are effective.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The inviolability of the status of the denuclearized zone will be guaranteed by the Powers possessing nuclear weapons, which would undertake to refrain from any action that might directly or indirectly interfere with that status, and not to use nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone.

These are the general provisions of the Polish plan for the creation of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe. The proposal takes full account of all the discussions that have taken place at international level since Mr. Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, first mooted the idea on 2 October 1957 before the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.697, para. 136). Our whole attitude and the amendments we have made in our plan testify to the fact that we approach this question without prejudice or dogmatic claims.

We are ready to consider any suggestion made with a view to improving our plan and making it more effective. We hope that will be the spirit informing our discussions on the question.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As recommended by the co-Chairmen, we are discussing collateral measures on certain problems connected with disarmament. The present method of discussion has been adopted because of the great difficulties we have encountered in our endeavours to carry further the discussion on general and complete disarmament and on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, and to solve these problems at the present time.

Despite the objections of our Western colleagues who insist -- and have always insisted -- on involving the Committee in technical and specialised considerations, and who are trying to exclude from our discussions all allusions to important political developments in international life, we cannot help thinking of the profound causes which underlie the failure of all our efforts to arrive at an agreement on the questions on our agenda.

It would, indeed, be incompatible with the spirit of our task to ask members of the Conference to deal with problems which are essentially political, while keeping aloof from current political events and holding our meetings in a vacuum. It would be vain to try and prevent the members of the Committee from drawing certain conclusions from current events.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

No discerning person can fail to see that the failure of the efforts made at the Conference to settle the problem of the elimination of the nuclear danger, in particular by the abolition of nuclear-weapon vehicles, is due to the difficulties placed in the way of an agreement by the measures for intensive rearmament recently adopted by the Western Powers and particularly by the United States. These measures, spread over a number of years on the basis of carefully elaborated plans for the purpose of pursuing and accelerating the nuclear armaments race, aim at increasing the stockpiles of new arms and particularly of nuclear-weapon vehicles, and at disseminating nuclear weapons throughout the territories of NATO members at the very time when Western representatives are busy discussing disarmament in our Committee.

I need hardly emphasize that it is impossible to arrive at an agreement on general and complete disarmament while the Western Powers are elaborating and carrying out plans aimed at a frantic acceleration of the armaments race. Nor is it possible to work for disarmament while making every effort, in accordance with the Nassau agreements, to give NATO's allies, and particularly the West German militarists, the possibility to employ nuclear arms, a subject with which our Polish colleague has already dwelt thoroughly. There can be no doubt that the actions of the Western Powers aimed at speeding up the armaments race are in direct contradiction with the efforts made here to eliminate the nuclear danger which overhangs humanity.

It is, moreover, inconceivable that the United States should really be working for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests while continuing its own tests, and that in spite of the General Assembly's resolution (A/RES/1762(XVII) ENDC/63) and the expressed wish of the peoples of the world to put an end to all nuclear experiments as soon as possible and by 1 January 1963 at the latest. By such an attitude it not only encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also tends to intensify the nuclear armaments race.

In these conditions it becomes all the more necessary for the Committee to concentrate its efforts on measures which could contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence between States, thus opening the way to progress that would enable us to attain our main objectives: general and complete disarmament, and the cessation of nuclear tests.

Various measures have been proposed in this connexion. We should like today to dwell more particularly on those to be found in document ENDC/75 of 12 February, namely, the Declaration presented by the Soviet Union on renunciation of the use of

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foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and in document ENDC/77 of 20 February on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between States members of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons constitutes a measure which might greatly assist a relaxation of international tension and contribute to the consolidation of peace and the creation of conditions propitious to the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and other related questions. Indeed, the implementation of this measure would immediately revive confidence between States and nations and would allay the fears created by the presence of offensive arms in their territories or in those of their neighbours. The strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons are of course offensive weapons. When they are stationed on foreign soil, in the territories of countries which are in no way threatened by an attack, they become aggressive weapons, weapons which create an atmosphere of suspicion and tension between States, and particularly between adjacent States. Mistrust thus created in international relations can provoke tensions of such acuteness that an armed conflict could easily develop into a general conflagration.

At the same time, the very presence of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons in a country's territory presents a tremendous danger for that country and its population. Indeed, in the event of an armed conflict, the installations of nuclear-weapon vehicles and particularly those of strategical nuclear weapons -- and consequently the country in which those installations are to be found -- will be the first targets of a counter-attack which will certainly be carried out with nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to dwell at present on the fact that the presence of military bases on foreign territory constitutes a completely abnormal situation and creates a permanent factor of disturbance in the development of the countries in which they are stationed. Whether initially set up with or without the consent of the respective governments, in time these bases not only become a source of tension for the whole of that area, but also give rise to tension between the country that has accepted them and the one at whose disposal they have been placed. There are numerous examples on which we do not think it necessary to dwell.

Despite the definite advantages of the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, some Western

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representatives -- and particularly the United Kingdom representative in his speech of 29 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.115, pp. 34-45) -- are resolutely and obstinately opposing this measure. Under the pretext that such a measure would upset the present balance of forces, that it would deprive the United States and certain other Western Powers of their military bases in other countries, they rejected this Soviet initiative out of hand.

What is more, the United Kingdom representative took the opportunity to launch into a fierce defence of military bases in foreign territory and particularly of the "re-organization" which the Western Powers, and particularly the United States, have recently embarked upon in the field of the deployment and modernization of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

"My Government" -- says Mr. Godber -- "has no doubt whatever that this Polaris ... system is becoming ... a major factor in maintaining the peace...". (ibid.p.40). And a little later the United Kingdom representative asserts that to renounce the Polaris system:

"... seems to us ... a retrograde step" -- you see, to renounce the Polaris system is a retrograde step -- "... not only for our own security but for the safety of the world as a whole". (ibid.)

So you see where we are now! In the light of these considerations, the only attitude compatible with world security would appear to be to continue the armaments race to the bitter end and to install strategic nuclear weapon bases in foreign territories -- in foreign territories throughout the world, of course. We venture to doubt that such an attitude can be reconciled with the manifest desire of the peoples to have nuclear arms withdrawn from State arsenals. Such statements -- really retrograde statements designed to serve an aggressive policy -- can only be described as propaganda for nuclear weapons and eulogies of their dissemination. These statements stand, moreover, in contradiction with the statement by the President of the United States on 22 October 1962 that:

"Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace."

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Such a position is incompatible with the objectives and aims assigned to our Committee by the General Assembly. We are here not to seek arguments for perfecting nuclear weapons and the strategic vehicles for their delivery; we are here in pursuance of the General Assembly's resolution and our Committee's task is to make every effort:

"... to avert the great dangers to the human race of nuclear confrontation ..."

and: "to conclude ... at the earliest possible date ... an agreement on general and complete disarmament ...". (A/RES/1767(XVII) — ENDC/64, p.2)

It is all the more strange and disappointing to hear at a disarmament conference words praising the "great value" and the "important advantages" — to use the expressions of the United Kingdom representative — of a "nuclear weapons delivery system" as an effective means of and a factor in maintaining peace and security (ENDC/PV.115, p.39). It is all the more strange and the more worrying as the specialists hold that the Polaris missiles are only "anti-city" weapons, that is to say, in their very conception weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, Mr. Godber did not let slip the opportunity to expound the historical origins of the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty; in an attempt to justify its existence. In trying to counter the apt remark of the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, that NATO was born of the Western Powers' aggressive policy, a policy based solely on force, the United Kingdom representative has tried to justify its creation in 1949 and its alleged defensive character by saying:

"During that period" — that is to say, the period 1948-49 — "it seemed all too likely that Western Europe was the next target for Russian expansion ..."

Was it surprising, then, that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 during that period of extreme tension? ... Our NATO alliance was entirely defensive. In its very creation it was defensive in character and was established solely to counter a massive Soviet threat." (ibid., p.37)

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Mr. Godber apparently considers this argument extremely convincing. He uses it to justify not only the creation of NATO but also the entire system of military and strategic measures at the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, measures which have been at the bottom of the mistrust between States and the international tension which have prevailed during the past few years. We shall not try to refute this argument, which has nothing to do with the facts or reality. Let a man of the West speak, one whose words even the Western representatives can hardly doubt. The man is Mr. John Foster Dulles, who on 8 March 1949 -- that is to say, hardly a month before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty -- warned the advocates of that aggressive pact in these terms. I have no French text of his statement; so I shall read it out in English, hoping that it will be well translated by those entrusted with this task in our Committee. It is a passage taken from the New York Times of 9 March 1949:

(continued in English)

"So far as it is humanly possible to judge, the Soviet Government, in the conditions now prevailing, does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy.

"I do not know of any responsible high official, military or civilian, in this government or any government, who believes that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

"It cannot be assumed that the Soviet Union (on the other hand) would not use the Red Army if its leaders felt that their homeland was imminently and seriously threatened".

(continued in French)

Recalling that in 1946 the Federal Council of Churches of Christ asked that the United States:

(continued in English)

"... should not seek military bases so close to the Soviet Union as to carry an offensive threat that is disproportionate to its defensive value", Mr. Dulles concluded:

"That is why our fellowship with the peoples of Western Europe and particularly with Scandinavian nations ought not to seem to bring United States military might directly to Russia's border. It would indeed involve

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"A high tribute to Soviet leaders to assume that under these circumstances they would exercise more self-control than would our people under comparable circumstances, as for example if the Soviet Union had military arrangements with a country at our border."

That quotation is an excerpt from Mr. Dulles' message to the Third National Conference on "Churches and World Order" sponsored by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

(continued in French)

In our opinion, these words require no comment. This statement by Mr. Dulles does more than refute Mr. Godber's arguments concerning the alleged "Soviet threat" which he claims to have been the principal reason for the setting up of NATO. Indeed, it is evidence for the opposite conclusion that the North Atlantic Alliance was and remains an aggressive alliance and that its creation was never warranted by defence considerations. Mr. Dulles was right in affirming that there was no Soviet threat in 1949 when NATO was created. Nor, a fortiori, is there any now.

Mr. Dulles' statement goes even further by condemning the establishment of Western bases near the Soviet Union at the very moment when preparations were being made for setting up the aggressive NATO alliance. It was certainly necessary to recall that statement to those now trying to defend and justify the existence of military bases in foreign territory -- particularly around the socialist countries.

We are convinced that the adoption of the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons will have a profound effect on the development of international relations. It will undoubtedly create an atmosphere of trust and co-operation among countries, thereby promoting the speedy solution of major current problems and in particular facilitating agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The second collateral measure proposed by the Soviet Union, that concerning the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic Treaty, is all the more easy to realize as it proposes no action on existing armaments or the armed forces on either side. All that is required is a solemn undertaking to abstain from any aggression, threat of force or use of force, by whatever means, that would be inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the

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United Nations Charter. There would of course also have to be an undertaking to settle all existing or potential problems and differences between the States by peaceful means, by negotiation between the parties concerned or by other methods for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.

If the North Atlantic Treaty is a defensive and peaceful organization, as the United Kingdom representative and other Western delegates have tried to prove -- which, by the way, as we have shown, is at variance with the views expressed by the former United States Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles -- there should be no difficulty for any member of NATO in giving such undertakings.

Now, some Western representatives have sought to oppose discussion of the proposed non-aggression pact on the pretext that such undertakings already exist for all States members of the United Nations under the Charter. Acceptance of such considerations and arguments would eliminate the need for any pact or treaty repeating the main purposes of the Charter between States members of the United Nations. But since the inception of the United Nations the Charter has provided the very basis for many treaties between different States members of the United Nations that confirm and reaffirm the purposes and principles of the Charter. Nor, using the same argument, would there be any need to re-assert and confirm that co-operation, friendship and good-neighbourly relations exist between the various countries, seeing that the Charter of the United Nations envisages and recommends the establishment of such relations between States. It is nevertheless common practice in international relations to solemnly affirm and reaffirm existing agreements, friendly relations and co-operation among States.

It is, moreover, inconceivable that countries can come to this Conference to propose measures to lessen the risks of unpremeditated war -- as in the United States proposals on reduction of the risk of war through accident (ENDC/70) -- and at the same time reject or at least object to -- discussion on the need for a non-aggression pact under which States would pledge themselves not to start a war intentionally. The question arises what need there would be of, or rather what point there would be in, measures to reduce the risk of an unpremeditated war breaking out, where there is a refusal to give or objection to giving an undertaking not to start a premeditated war and not to settle differences between States by use of arms or other types of force.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has always been a fervent advocate of non-aggression pacts between neighbouring countries and between States with unsettled differences. Our country has repeatedly proposed a non-aggression pact between the Balkan countries, which would enable all outstanding problems to be settled by peaceful means. At the same time, we should like to recall that when the idea of a non-aggression pact between member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO was put forward for the first time the People's Republic of Bulgaria immediately supported the idea. A declaration unanimously voted by the National Assembly on 15 January 1958 reads as follows:

"Such an agreement" -- that is, a non-aggression agreement between member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO -- "would be in perfect accord with the interests of the European peoples and would contribute to strengthening security in Europe and the world".

The Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the North Atlantic Treaty met here with the support of several delegations, particularly those of the non-aligned countries, when it was put forward. At the same time, certain delegations from the Western Powers, though not too enthusiastic, did not reject it. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, deeply convinced that such a pact would contribute to an immediate improvement in relations between the States of these two main military groupings and to a more wholesome atmosphere and climate throughout the world, will do everything in its power to ensure the conclusion of such a pact.

We hope that the Western Powers, and in particular the United States, will find it possible to re-examine their position and to support the proposals made by the Soviet Union -- both that relating to the declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons and that concerning the non-aggression pact, which would help to ease tension and enable obstacles to general and complete disarmament to be removed.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Today, as at our meeting last Friday (ENDC/PV.115), the Soviet Union, Romanian, Polish and Bulgarian delegations have put before the Committee their ideas and proposals concerning collateral disarmament measures on which they think agreement might be reached. Those delegations have, in particular, submitted to the Committee, proposals which we already know for a declaration against foreign bases for strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/75) and for a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77).

Already at last Friday's meeting, the United Kingdom representative examined one of these proposals, the draft declaration against foreign bases. In an outstanding statement, Mr. Godber analyzed the draft in detail, paragraph by paragraph (ENDC/PV.115, pp. 34-45). He proved the completely unbalanced nature of the proposal, supporting his contentions with irrefutable arguments. This morning's statements by the delegations of Poland and Bulgaria have provided no new elements of any value on the subject: they have merely added tendentious polemical arguments which in no way improve the atmosphere of our meetings. Mr. Godber's reasoning remains in all its logical force. His reasoning is based on facts and data which are too clear to be weakened by the arguments of the delegations of the countries of the East. White remains white and black remains black despite the attempts to distort Western thinking.

So long as the Soviet proposals aim at weakening the integrated defensive organization of the West, aim at weakening it in a unilateral and unbalanced manner in patent violation of the principles accepted and sanctioned by the United Nations, we must, unfortunately, entertain serious doubts about the Eastern Powers' intentions of arriving at general and complete disarmament and of speedily concluding constructive agreements here.

My delegation considers it superfluous to revert to the draft declaration on bases. It has already affirmed and must energetically reaffirm today that all bases -- whether called foreign or national, whether equipped with Polaris missiles or not -- must undoubtedly be eliminated at a given stage in the disarmament process. But that must be done progressively without giving either side any military advantages.

Our plan for general and complete disarmament already envisages, as regards bases, that during the first stage there will be a 30 per cent reduction in armaments (ENDC/30). That is a positive measure consistent with the fundamental principles of disarmament, and we should give it consideration if we wish to reduce, and subsequently to eliminate, the danger inherent in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Again, also at last Friday's (ENDC/PV.115) and this morning's meetings, the Soviet Union and other socialist delegations spoke at length on their proposal for a non-aggression pact between the member countries of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty. I venture to point out at once that it is odd, to say the least, that a proposal aimed, according to the Soviet Union delegation, at improving East-West relations, should be submitted to the accompaniment of speeches replete with unjust and groundless charges against the policy of the Western Powers. The Soviet Union delegation overwhelmed us -- or rather thought to overwhelm us -- with reproaches, attributing to us all sorts of aggressive and bellicose machinations. It is most regrettable that a non-aggression pact should be so presented, imputing to us intentions that might almost be described as criminal, and in language that, to my mind, was itself aggressive.

I have already said that if the Soviet Union firmly believed that we had sinister designs, it would not be showing realism in proposing a non-aggression pact to us. Mr. Tsarapkin replied to me in one of his statements that, in spite of everything, there were still in the West healthy currents of public opinion in favour of peace. I should like to observe to Mr. Tsarapkin -- who, by the way, is not listening to me -- that his opinion on the strength of these currents would be most pessimistic if the situation in the West were really as he describes it.

The Soviet Union is actually well aware of our desire for peace, as also of the solemn pledges which the Western governments, individually and collectively, have given to their peoples and to the whole world. It knows full well that concrete proofs of this desire for peace have been constantly given since the inception of our alliance.

During our meeting on 20 February Mr. Kuznetsov, referring to the policy of the Western Powers, described it as:

"... a policy which recognized only force in dealing with contentious issues and considered that such issues could only be resolved by the use of force." (ENDC/PV.100, p.51)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I should like to ask the Soviet Union delegation what the facts are to substantiate its contentions. With all due respect to Mr. Kuznetsov, I must say that to my mind the precise opposite is true. The Western Powers, even in particularly delicate and serious circumstances when the Soviet Union had initiated perilous action have always leaned towards negotiation. That does not mean that we can shut our eyes to the present situation and ignore the open or veiled threats aimed at us, which are often uttered in official statements of the East. Have we not recently heard about "the last spadefuls of earth to be thrown on the grave of the Western world?"

Speeches like those we heard here on Friday and hear again today are at variance with the proposal for a non-aggression pact. Nor should it be forgotten that a country which still belongs to the Eastern bloc is openly considering war as an instrument for spreading the communist ideology.

I have said -- and I repeat -- that Italy will always support any measure that may lessen international tension and improve the atmosphere. In that connexion, we do not exclude the possibility of an exchange, well-timed and in the most appropriate and effective framework of solemn declarations between East and West. But such declarations can only be given substance and made logical and understandable if initially based on concrete facts. That will be the real proof of all-round goodwill. Declarations or pacts will stem almost naturally from the facts.

Unfortunately, when we go into practical questions at Geneva or elsewhere, we do not find the Soviet Union making overtures in keeping with its asserted desires. What facts within the framework of our Conference, particularly regarding collateral measures, might be taken as proofs of the Soviet Union's spirit of goodwill and collaboration and form the subject of immediate agreements?

At the first meeting of the Committee of the Whole, held on 28 March 1962, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared:

"A third field in which, in my opinion, action should be taken without delay because viewpoints do not seem to lie too far apart is that of agreement on measures aimed at preventing war by mistake or a surprise attack. Such an agreement would immediately give us invaluable security while our work on general and complete disarmament continued relentlessly, and would allow us to proceed with our task in peace of mind." (ENDC/C.I/PV.1, p.10)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Soviet Union delegation refused discussion of this collateral measure in the form in which it was proposed by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. That explains why the Western delegations, in a spirit of compromise, came to sub-divide their proposal under two heads -- namely, as I have said: surprise attacks and risks of war by accident. The Western delegations expressed their willingness to discuss only the second -- that is to say, risks of war by accident -- hoping that surprise attacks could be tackled later.

So the Western delegations are now proposing, as initial collateral measures on which we should reach agreement, limited measures that are very simple and easy to implement yet sufficient to eliminate risks of war by accident.

The United States representative clearly explained these proposals at our last Friday's meeting (ENDC/PV.115, pp.13-20). I shall not go over his most lucid explanations. The proposals, as you know, are in three parts: exchange of military information, exchange of military missions and the establishment of direct communications between Washington and Moscow. Agreement can be reached on these proposals either as a whole or separately, as the delegations of the socialist countries prefer. These delegations have not yet stated their position. The Soviet Union delegation merely observed in passing at an earlier meeting that its proposals concerning risks of war by accident were included in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2, Rev.1). That was said at a time when the Committee had not yet started discussing collateral measures. I hope that remark of the Soviet delegation's does not mean that it would refuse to examine this question as an urgent collateral measure outside the disarmament treaty. For if there are any measures needed prior to any agreement -- apart from the question of nuclear tests -- they are precisely the precautions to be taken against the possibility of a war by accident. That is a logical first step. Let us above all ensure that there will be no disastrous mistake. I think that our governments have proved by irrefutable facts that they wish to avoid war. Let us make sure that their desire remains alive and effective in all circumstances and that uncontrolled events can never prevail to alter the course of history against the will of our rulers.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

If we could reach an initial agreement on this question, we might hope to go on from there to other agreements of ever-growing scope and efficacy. These are the Italian delegation's views on the discussion of collateral measures. Let us first agree on concrete, useful, simple and easy questions, and then go on to wider and more important issues. The results will give us tangible proofs of our mutual good intentions; subsequently perhaps, if need be, acknowledged and underlined by solemn declarations exchanged in an appropriate framework.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): My delegation has already had an opportunity to point out in another connexion how much importance it attaches to the discussion and adoption of concrete measures which would really help towards improving the international atmosphere and towards reducing the danger of nuclear war even before the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Today I should like to make clear our attitude towards the two drafts submitted by the Soviet Union -- the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Pact and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). At the same time I reserve the right to speak at one of our subsequent meetings on other proposals submitted for our consideration, in the first place on the question of the creation of denuclearized zones.

My delegation has studied with great attention the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, at our meeting on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp.20-33) on the draft declaration. The explanations he gave show the tremendous importance and significance of this proposed measure for reducing the risk of nuclear war. We are also of the opinion that strategic means of delivery stationed at bases on foreign territories are the most aggressive weapons of the military machine and create an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion in international relations, an atmosphere which from day to day, from hour to hour, threatens to spark off a nuclear conflict.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Our own experience fully confirms the need for such a declaration. It is no secret that to the west of our boundaries military installations and missile bases are being established, the existence of which is a constant threat to the security of our Republic.

For these reasons we consider the draft declaration to be a measure which directly relates to one of the most burning problems of today, on the solution of which depend to a considerable extent the improvement of the international situation and the achievement of agreement on a number of other issues, including that of general and complete disarmament.

We cannot, of course, agree with the remarks of the representative of Italy who, a few minutes ago, associated himself (supra. p. 27) with the statements and remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber. We know that at the meeting on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp.34-45) Mr. Godber spoke against adopting the draft declaration and tried to prove that it was unacceptable to the NATO States. The representatives of Poland and Bulgaria have already referred today to the grounds on which Mr. Godber based his negative point of view. At the same time they showed the flimsiness and artificial nature of Mr. Godber's objections. That, of course, dispenses me from considering all the remarks of the United Kingdom representative in greater detail. However, I should like to make just a few comments.

It seems to me that all those objections of Mr. Godber would not have been put forward, if their author had given a little more thought to the existing political and military situation, if he had been guided by a real desire for the adoption of measures that would result in eliminating the threat of a nuclear war. In the present circumstances, when the range of action of nuclear missiles over our planet is practically unlimited, it is hardly possible to put forward geographical factors to justify the creation of such bases for the purpose of ensuring defence, as it is asserted.

Everyone knows the statements made by prominent representatives of the two main world Powers to the effect that the defence of their countries is fully ensured by nuclear weapons located on their own national territory. Typical in this regard are the statements made by the President and the Secretary of Defence of the United States, to which Mr. Tsarapkin referred at the meeting on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, p.26). In this connexion, however, I should like to recall the words of the famous military and political commentator of The New York Times, Hanson Baldwin. In that newspaper on 8 November 1962, Hanson Baldwin not only confirmed the view that inter-continental ballistic rockets,

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

atomic submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, and the possibility of refuelling strategic bombers in flight, had reduced the dependence of the United States on foreign bases; at the same time he recognized the true role of those bases which, according to him, is at present determined by political motives. Those bases must serve as the instruments of a global strategy, that is, they must serve the strivings for world domination and be weapons for combating national liberation movements.

That statement shows that the existence of such bases only contributes to the further aggravation of international tension and seriously threatens the cause of peace throughout the world.

Today, already, we see the danger arising from the creation of a global system of bases with strategic means of delivery, in the first place bases for nuclear submarines and other ships equipped with nuclear missiles. Simultaneously with the growth of these bases, international tension is becoming more acute and negotiations on a number of outstanding international political problems are becoming more difficult. The foci of a nuclear war are being disseminated throughout a vast territory.

The representatives of Poland and Bulgaria have today drawn attention to Mr. Godber's attempt to justify the accelerated creation of the Polaris system by asserting that it makes war by accident or war by miscalculation far less likely.

Such views, of course, represent an attempt to justify the continuation of the armaments race and aggressive preparations on a scale unprecedented in history. The representative of Bulgaria also pointed out that in Mr. Godber's opinion, in order to eliminate the risk of war by accident, it was necessary not to abandon a policy leading to war and not to take really effective measures against it, but, on the contrary, to whip up the nuclear armaments race and to improve weapons, particularly nuclear missiles.

It seems to me that there is no need to show how dangerous it is to assert that the establishment of a new system of nuclear weapons supported by bases on foreign territory reduces the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. In this connexion I shall not go into details concerning the risk connected with the failure of equipment or the psychological state of the personnel servicing this equipment. I shall merely deal with the circumstances in which this system is being created. It is well known that part of these means of delivery is to form the basis of the NATO multilateral force. Other States members of NATO will jointly with the United States take the decision for their use. Thus nuclear weapons are, in fact, being spread also to those countries which have so far not possessed them, in particular to the West German revenge-seekers. And here we come to a fact the danger of which stands out most clearly.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

It seems to me that it is quite superfluous to try to convince anyone that there is no difference between being killed by a nuclear missile launched from a base located on foreign territory or by one launched from the territory of a State possessing such missiles. However, what is not superfluous and what all of us must strive for is to prevent altogether the possibility of such a missile being launched. Yet such a possibility is immeasurably increased by reason of the existence of numerous bases on foreign territory, and by reason of the fact that more and more hands are stretching towards the button which could bring the mechanism of a nuclear war into action.

It is instructive that the governments of certain countries, including members of the Western military groupings, are coming to the conclusion that the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on their territories has nothing in common with their defence. In this regard we know the wise decision of Iran not to allow such bases to be established on its territory, as well as the efforts of the Cyprus government to prevent a United States nuclear force from being established itself on the island. The decision of those governments substantially helps to ensure the security of their countries.

For all the reasons which I have adduced we fully support the measures envisaged in the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet delegation.

And now, Mr. Chairman, permit me to pass on to the next question — a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. I should like to state that the Czechoslovak delegation most resolutely supports the draft pact put forward by the Soviet delegation.

It would be difficult to deny the urgent need for the proposed measure. Hardly anyone can fail to recognize the danger arising from the fact that two groups of States, including the States now possessing the entire nuclear potential, are opposing each other in the divided world of today.

In a situation where many unresolved problems exist this fact creates an increased danger which cannot be disregarded. The events which the world experienced in the autumn of last year in connexion with the crisis in the Caribbean have served as a warning and have stressed the urgent need for the measure proposed by the Soviet delegation. It was quite natural that during those troubled days the idea of a non-aggression pact should have been revived, an idea which the Soviet Union and other socialist States had been putting forward for a number of years.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

The socialist States, united on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 14 May 1955 for joint defence against aggression, have already given many proofs of the fact that their alliance is of an exclusively defensive nature and is not at all directed against any particular State or any group of States. The Warsaw Treaty itself was concluded with a view to creating a European system of collective security. The treaty is open to other States

"irrespective of their social and political structure, which express their readiness, by participating in the present Treaty, to help in combining the efforts of the peace-loving States to ensure the peace and security of the peoples." (United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 219, p.30, Article 9)

Another characteristic feature of the Treaty is that it will cease to exist as soon as an all-European treaty for collective security comes into force.

These main features of the Warsaw Treaty show clearly enough that the socialist States do not place their alliance above the interests of universal security but, on the contrary, that they systematically strive to ensure the security of their own and other States within the framework of an effective European and worldwide system.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is founded on an altogether different basis. Its origin is connected with the aggressive preparations of the Western Powers aimed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The NATO Treaty has created serious obstacles to the fulfilment of the purposes laid down by the Charter of the United Nations, in the field of collective security.

If the situation had not been so, the Western Powers would have long ago accepted the proposals repeatedly put forward by the Soviet Union for the creation of an effective system of collective security in Europe, which would deprive all military alliances of any reason for their existence.

However, despite all past and present opportunities for putting an end to the suspicion and mistrust which has prevailed for a number of years, actually since the end of the Second World War an abnormal situation has existed in the world.

This abnormal situation consists, primarily, in the fact that questions of peace and security can become the subject of arbitrary decisions by a certain group of States.

In these circumstances, the foremost place is taken by the urgent task of uniting the efforts of all States to eliminate the present tension in the world and to liquidate all potential sources of a world conflict. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between

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the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries would be an extremely important contribution to this cause. It would mean the acceptance of a new international obligation, the effect of which would appear in a radical improvement of the international atmosphere. The gist of the proposed international obligation would consist in a solemn re-affirmation of the obligation of all States to exclude aggression, the threat of force or the use of force from the mutual relations between the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and the countries parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other. Such an obligation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of a similar principle laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and, on a treaty basis, would extend it to other States not yet members of the United Nations. At the same time it would be a consistent application of the principle of non-aggression to the specific conditions of the present situation. The moral and political significance of such an obligation would consist in the mutual assurance of the States of the two groups that they harbour no aggressive designs against each other and are ready to be guided in their dealings by the principles of peaceful mutual relations and co-operation in solving the problems facing the international community. The obligation to refrain from aggression, the threat or use of force or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, both against each other and in their international relations in general, is supplemented in the Soviet draft by an obligation to settle all disputes that might arise exclusively by peaceful means. It is well-known that unsettled international disputes threaten peace and peaceful relations between States. The settlement of disputes must be carried out by peaceful means, among which direct negotiations occupy an important place.

The Soviet draft non-aggression pact envisages the setting up of consultative machinery, the use of which would enhance the guarantee of the timely settlement of all situations creating a threat to peace and security, and would make it possible to avert any potential danger arising from such situations.

The entire Soviet draft is imbued with the idea of the maintenance of lasting peace. Its concluding articles provide for the pact to remain in force so long as the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty remain in force. Of course, the most radical solution would be an agreement to liquidate NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and to take measures for the consolidation of the universal and European systems of security. However, taking into account the continued opposition of the Western Powers to such a radical measure,

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for the transition period we consider it essential that the existing dangerous situation — when two groups possessing a tremendous military potential, including a nuclear force of unimaginable power, are facing each other — should be overcome by the mutual assumption of an obligation to avoid aggression or any other use or threat of force in mutual relations.

As we have already pointed out, the conclusion of a pact would undoubtedly have a wholesome effect on the international situation. It would strengthen confidence between States to a considerable extent and would reduce to a minimum the risk of war through accident. It would eliminate all pretexts for continuing the absurd armaments race and would keep in check the advocates of the policy "from a position of strength".

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact is more urgent today than it has ever been before. The implementation of plans for creating a NATO multilateral force and for spreading nuclear weapons to additional States is still further increasing the threat to peace and to the security of the peoples. Nuclear weapons are to come into the hands of the most aggressive forces within the NATO group — into the hands of the West German revenge-seekers. In conjunction with the revenge-seeking militaristic ideology which permeates the activities of West German government circles, nuclear weapons in the hands of the Bundeswehr become a dangerous means of involving the peoples of Europe in a thermonuclear war. This circumstance brings a new and dangerous element into the present international situation.

In this connexion, it is significant that in the course of our negotiations the representatives of the Western Powers have taken an essentially negative attitude towards the idea of a pact. Although they are trying to cover this up with objections of a procedural nature or, as we have heard today, by alleging the unsuitability of the present time, it is not difficult to perceive the real reason for their dislike of the Soviet draft pact. The fact is that the adoption of the pact would considerably restrict the opportunities of those aggressive circles in the West — in particular, the West German militarists — who are fostering plans for new military adventures and are unwilling to give up the insane idea of revenge and aggression against the socialist countries. The question legitimately arises: how can we believe in the sincerity of the assurances of the readiness to discuss measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war and the causes of the present tension in the world, when really positive and effective measures which, moreover, do not affect to any extent the balance of power in the world and require no concessions, and which do not create strategic or other advantages for either side, meet with a negative reaction on the part of the Western Powers?

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For this reason my delegation considers it imperative that at this stage of the negotiations our Committee should seriously consider this most urgent question -- a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO -- and that it should take into account all the possibilities that would arise from the conclusion of a pact, in particular the possibility of making further progress in the question of general and complete disarmament.

Is there anything unacceptable in that? Only people who deny the reality of the modern world and who try to alter its face by means of armed force can adopt a negative attitude towards the pact.

We are convinced that the implementation of both the measures proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union would be an important step towards reducing the danger of a nuclear war and would be an important factor in regard to easing international tension. It would also facilitate the solution of our main problem -- general and complete disarmament.

My delegation expresses its conviction that these two drafts will meet with support on the part of the majority of the delegations.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At the meeting on 29 March, the Soviet delegation explained its proposals and views on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension (ENDC/PV.115, pp. 20-33). The alarming development of international events recently makes it necessary to speed up the achievement of agreement on the implementation of measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. That is why the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee in February 1963 a draft treaty on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and a draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77).

It cannot be denied that the implementation of these proposals would have a great positive influence on the development of international relations. It would help to create an atmosphere of confidence, the absence of which is hampering progress also in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament and settling other international problems.

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The representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, pointed out in one of his statements that the sense of security was constantly decreasing as the armaments race developed and continued. That is a correct recognition, but in recognizing the danger of the speeding up of the armaments race it is also essential to recognize the need to take measures to put an end to it and to solve the main problem of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, there is nothing of that in the United States proposals. If we study the arguments of the United States, the approach of the Western Powers and their method of selecting measures which might stop the further development of the armaments race and thereby check the constant diminution of the sense of security of States, we see that the Western Powers are concerned not with stopping the armaments race, but with maintaining the military balance. That is uppermost in their minds and that is what determines their negative attitude towards any proposal before the Committee which provides for effective disarmament measures or effective measures aimed at reducing the danger of war. Under the pretext of maintaining the so-called military balance, the Western Powers object to such effective disarmament measures as the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament. They object to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the first and even in the second stage of disarmament; they are against the proposal to renounce the stationing of strategic missiles at foreign bases; they show no interest in, and do not want to discuss, the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and so on. That is how the Western Powers' concept of military balance looks in reality.

The representatives of the Western Powers gave as the reason for their unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposal on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons the fact that the Soviet Union has no such bases abroad and that on this account such a disarmament measure would be unilateral. But how can one speak of a unilateral measure when the Soviet Union is proposing to eliminate in the first stage missiles of every range, including intercontinental and global missiles in which the superiority of the Soviet Union is unquestionable, as President Kennedy himself admitted in his Press Conference of 3 April.

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The representatives of the Western Powers, basing themselves on this concept of maintaining the military balance, are striving to emasculate the idea of disarmament and are trying to ensure the continuation of the armaments race and of military preparations and to prevent the implementation of measures which are really aimed at putting an end to the armaments race and military preparations, that is, measures which would really contribute to reducing the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, speaking last Friday (ENDC/PV.115, p.38), alleged that we gave an untrue picture of Western Germany today, and that those who now direct affairs in Western Germany are paragons of peacefulness and of respect for other States. At the same time, Mr. Godber tried to cast aspersions on the policy of the German Democratic Republic.

It suffices to look at the facts, however, to ascertain the real position and the real character of the policies of the two German States. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is in favour of the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, thereby agreeing that the territory of that country should be free of nuclear weapons. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany rejects that plan and is persistently striving to obtain nuclear weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, as a member of the Warsaw Treaty, is willing to sign a non-aggression treaty with the NATO countries. The Government of the German Federal Republic is the most active opponent of such a pact. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is in favour of normalizing the relations between the two German States; the Government of the German Federal Republic is categorically opposed to any measure aimed at that normalization. The position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the question of ensuring security in Europe and on the question of disarmament has been stated with the utmost clarity in the telegram sent on 4 April 1963 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Bolz, to the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In order to enable the members of the Committee to acquaint themselves with the point of view of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the questions being discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, I shall take the liberty of reading out this telegram and I request the Secretariat to issue it as an official document of our Conference.^{1/} Here is the text of the telegram:

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"Mr. Chairman,

"Deeply concerned with European security and disarmament, I address myself, on behalf of the government of the German Democratic Republic, to you and through you to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of the United Nations.

"At an earlier occasion, one year ago, I had the honour to present to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee a Memorandum of the government of the German Democratic Republic ^{2/} containing constructive proposals for a contribution to disarmament to be made by the two German states, which contribution is a special obligation for the German people after two world wars.

"Unfortunately, the strive for détente and disarmament is being jeopardised by some NATO countries seeking to set up multinational and multilateral nuclear forces.

"Participation in any sort of NATO nuclear force by the German Federal Republic and the Hitlerite generals commanding its armed forces is bound to undermine any attempt to come to terms about ending nuclear armament, leave alone that this would make general and complete disarmament highly improbable.

"The government of the German Democratic Republic, therefore, regards it as its duty to reiterate its willingness to do everything in its power for a German contribution towards international détente, a stop to nuclear armament and general and complete disarmament.

"Mindful of the fact that any agreement on disarmament is particularly difficult as long as the two German states are facing each other as enemies and, consequently, a German peace settlement is complicated, the German Democratic Republic has proposed that the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic should conclude an agreement of reason and good will. It provides for the two German states to renounce solemnly the use of force in any form, any attempts and efforts to question or change the borders of the other German state, the testing, possession, manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons as well as control over them. Furthermore, the two German states should put into effect an arms stop linked up with an obligation not to increase military expenditure. The two German states should reach further agreements on disarmament.

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"With this proposal the government of the German Democratic Republic has once again proved its good will and readiness to open the way for disarmament from German soil. The implementation of the agreement of reason and good will would have a favourable effect on the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the states of NATO and the Warsaw treaty, on an agreement on the prevention of the further spread of atomic weapons, and on general and complete disarmament.

"The government of the German Democratic Republic hopes that the constructive proposals will be considered as expression of its sincere willingness to do everything possible to foster the activities of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

"A telegram with similar contents has been sent to the co-Chairman of the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Mr. Charles C. Stelle.

"Accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurance of my high consideration.

Dr. Lothar Bolz

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
German Democratic Republic

Berlin, 4th April, 1963."

Such is the position of the German Democratic Republic in regard to the maintenance of peace and the drive for disarmament.

A different position is taken by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany; it is openly opposed to the implementation of any disarmament measures. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is exerting a decisive influence on the position of the Western Powers also in regard to other questions connected with the ensuring of security in Europe; in particular, it is playing a clearly disruptive role in the question of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

When at past NATO meetings the question of concluding such a pact was dealt with to some extent, it was the Federal Republic of Germany which adopted the most negative and the most bellicose attitude.

Thus, at the NATO meeting in Athens in May 1962 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schroeder, spoke against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and States parties to the Warsaw

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Treaty. He spoke against the normalisation of relations between the two German States. These are facts, and they show convincingly the real intentions of each of the two German States. These facts give us grounds to believe that here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee the representatives of the Western Powers are even afraid to speak of a pact, precisely in order not to incur the displeasure of their West German partners. It has now become quite obvious that the Federal Republic of Germany is beginning to play a dominant role in NATO and is exerting increasing influence on the development of this military bloc and on the trend of the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Ignoring the lessons of the past, the Western Powers are taking up the defence of the militarist and revenge-seeking forces controlling the affairs of Western Germany. Strange as it may seem the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, displayed particular zeal in this respect. He pictured the present West German militarists and revenge-seekers in delicate rosy colours, trying to portray them as gentle, peace-loving lambs, and loyal members of the Western military bloc, the aggressive intentions of which are obvious to everyone.

In his statement on 29 March, Mr. Godber devoted considerable effort to proving something that cannot be proved, namely, that NATO is of a defensive nature. The representative of the United Kingdom even delved into history in an attempt to find confirmation for his fantasies regarding the defensive nature of NATO. Since Mr. Godber dived into the waves of history, we deem it necessary to remind him that in the annals of history the stages in which NATO was built up are clearly recorded.

I shall not deal with the deep-down currents, that is, the hidden processes of the formation of this aggressive bloc of the Western Powers. I shall begin rather with what appears on the surface of political life. The first thing that should be noted in this connexion is Mr. Churchill's speech at Fulton which ushered in the policy of the "cold war". Soon afterwards came the Truman doctrine and the Western Alliance, both predecessors of NATO, which indicated very definitely the aggressive course taken by the Western Powers under the leadership of the United States even before the "Berlin crisis" with which Mr. Godber began his historical investigation last time. And even this "Berlin crisis" was the consequence of the policy of the Western Powers aimed at creating a separate West German State.

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It is an indisputable fact that NATO was created in 1949, whereas the Warsaw Treaty was signed only in 1955 and after repeated warnings from the Socialist countries to the Governments of the Western Powers and after Western Germany, despite these warnings, was included in NATO. While as regards the non-aggression pact the representatives of the Western Powers have so far limited themselves to silence, although this silence can only be interpreted as expressing their negative attitude towards this proposal of the Soviet Union, as regards the other Soviet proposal, the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, we have had a sufficiently wordy statement by one of the representatives of these Powers.

I am referring again to the statement (ENDC/FV.115, pp.34-45) made on 29 March by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, in which he said that the Soviet proposal was unacceptable to the Western Powers. The arguments adduced by Mr. Godber to justify the position of the Western Powers in this matter are thoroughly false and quite amazing. In fact, if we analyse the gist of Mr. Godber's arguments, we see that they virtually call upon us not to carry out disarmament measures but to intensify the armaments race. How else can we interpret Mr. Godber's assertion that the military measures of the Western Powers, including the creation of nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles fitted with nuclear warheads, not only do not increase the military threat but, on the contrary, as he said, are a major factor in maintaining the peace. So it would appear, according to the reasoning of the United Kingdom representative, that it is not the elimination of armaments and armed forces or even their reduction, but, on the contrary, the modernization and improvement of the present armament systems that constitute a guarantee for the security of the whole world.

We, of course, cannot agree with such conclusions or with such acrobatic performances in logic, whatever the references to the importance of the invulnerability of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, in which Mr. Godber takes refuge.

The development of military technology shows that the improvement of one type of weapon inevitably leads to the improvement of other types, and this will continue indefinitely if not decisively and irrevocably checked. The same applies, of course, to nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, which, according to Mr. Godber, are at

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present invulnerable. In time these Polaris vessels will become obsolete, just as have the Thor and Jupiter missiles which the Polaris missiles are now intended to replace.

If we were to follow the path Mr. Godber invites us to take, there would be no need to conduct negotiations on disarmament, and we should back up the call of the Western Powers: "Arm as much as you can; arm as quickly and as effectively as you can."

But I do not think that we are gathered here for that purpose. Equally ineffectual is Mr. Godber's attempt (*ibid*, p.39) to prove the "imbalance" -- I am using his own expression -- the "imbalance" of the concessions which each of the sides would have to make under the Soviet draft declaration. Mr. Godber tried to weigh the advantages and disadvantages for each side and came to the conclusion that, if the Soviet declaration were accepted, NATO would be the loser.

We believe that the losers would be those who are hatching aggressive plans and that only the cause of peace would be the victor. We must not approach the problems of disarmament and the questions connected with disarmament from the standpoint of generals and admirals, as Mr. Godber and other representatives of the Western Powers have tried to do, because in that case there would never be disarmament, and the threat of war would continue to grow until the vortex of a thermonuclear catastrophe overwhelmed mankind.

In trying to justify his assertion in some way, Mr. Godber points out that the Soviet Union does not at present have strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territory whereas the West does. In the opinion of the representative of the United Kingdom, that is precisely what constitutes the main element of the imbalance of the concessions envisaged by the Soviet draft declaration. It follows from what Mr. Godber said that in order to get his agreement to the Soviet proposal for renunciation of the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territory, it would be necessary for the Soviet Union, in its turn, to build military bases abroad and station its strategic nuclear missile weapons there, just as the Western Powers have done, and it would be necessary for the Soviet Union, just like the United States, to use such foreign bases in order to shelter from time to time its atomic submarines armed with Polaris nuclear missiles.

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Mr. Godber considers that only then will it be possible to persuade the Western Powers to come to an agreement providing for the implementation of the measures laid down in the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union. We cannot agree with this strange argument of the Western Powers. In its negotiations on disarmament, the Soviet Union is guided not by the desire to retain any military advantages or by attempts to secure the most advantageous positions for attack, but by the genuine interests of the cause of disarmament, by the genuine interests of peace for all. Everyone knows that in the post-war period the Soviet Government liquidated all the foreign bases which the Soviet Union had on the territory of other States. The draft declaration proposed by the Soviet Union does not provide for a unilateral obligation, as the representatives of the Western Powers wrongly try to interpret it; it provides for reciprocal obligations. If the Soviet declaration were to be accepted, not only the Western Powers would assume the obligation to renounce the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States, but exactly the same obligation would be assumed by the Soviet Union. It would mean that the Soviet Union also would bind itself not to station in foreign territory either its own atomic submarines armed with nuclear missiles, or its strategic missiles, or its strategic military air force.

The world situation is changing rapidly — unfortunately, not as yet in the direction of peace but in the direction of the intensification of military preparations — and what does not exist today may very easily emerge tomorrow. In order to avert the irremediable we should straight away organize the relations between States in such a way as to restrict to the fullest extent the possibility of dangerous and explosive situations arising and to raise obstacles in the path leading to such a dangerous development of events. This purpose is met by the declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet draft declaration is based on equal obligations and, of course, it

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does not entail any prejudice to the security of any of the parties; on the contrary, it would strengthen their security. As we have emphasized, the declaration would in no way disturb the balance of forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. This balance of forces, the basis of which is now constituted by intercontinental missiles stationed on the national territories of the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, would remain unchanged. At the same time the allies of the United States, including the United Kingdom, would be in a much less dangerous position than they are now, when they have United States nuclear missile bases on their territories. In the existing situation, these countries which, contrary to the wish of their own peoples, have made available to the United States military bases on their territories, will inevitably serve as the targets of a lightning nuclear counter-stroke. And it will make no difference, of course, whether land-based foreign missiles or bases for nuclear submarines are located in the territory of these countries; in either case the counter-stroke, the aim of which will be to hit the means of delivering nuclear weapons, will inevitably entail catastrophic consequences for any country which has made its territory available for the stationing of these means.

Recent events have shown with ever increasing clarity — and I should like Mr. Cavalletti also to listen to me — that for the Pentagon bases on foreign territory are a means of deflecting a nuclear counter-stroke from the territory of the United States itself. The United States military strategists are resorting to this monstrous manoeuvre, the purpose of which is to draw nuclear death on to their allies and to deflect this death from themselves or at least to reduce the risk of such a death. This, moreover, was admitted by the United States Minister of Defence, Mr. McNamara, in a statement he made to the Congress Sub-Committee on Appropriations a month and a half ago. Referring to the main purpose of stationing United States Bomarc missile bases in Canada — listen, General Burns — Mr. McNamara emphasized that although the missiles were obsolete, they could be used — and I quote his words — "to draw Russian counter-strokes away from other targets". To expose Canada to a nuclear blow and to deflect it from the United States — such is the philosophy underlying the military plans of

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the United States. The United States strategists are guided by the same philosophy when they station their missiles in England, Scotland, West Germany, Italy, Turkey and so forth. The Pentagon, which has strategic long-range nuclear missiles on the territory of the United States itself, needs nuclear bases on foreign territory in order to deflect a nuclear blow from the United States. That is precisely how the aforementioned statement by Mr. McNamara was evaluated, in particular by Congressman Mitchel. This aspect of the matter should be given serious thought by those governments which are staking the fate of their countries and peoples with such dangerous levity by making their territories available for the stationing of United States means of delivering nuclear weapons.

The Soviet draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territory for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons is aimed at lessening international tension and precluding the possibility of a war breaking out, and in that way at really protecting States against the threat to which they are now exposing themselves as a result of the presence of foreign nuclear bases on their territories.

Now I should like to deal with the proposal submitted to the Committee by the United States on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication (ENDC/70). Speaking at the meeting of the Committee on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp.13-20), the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, asserted that this proposal answers the purpose of reducing international tension. He also tried to convince us that the measures provided for in the United States proposal could easily be carried out. He also pointed out that the plans of the United States (ENDC/30) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) relating to general and complete disarmament include three measures from among those which the United States is proposing and that they are very similar in both plans. It is true that the Soviet Union, in going forward to meet the position of the Western Powers, included in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, an obligation for States, during the disarmament process, to provide the international disarmament organization with advance information on all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes, as well as on all movements of military aircraft and military vessels. The Soviet draft also provides for the exchange of

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military missions and for the establishment of more direct and reliable means of communication between States. Furthermore, in order to reduce the danger of war during the disarmament process, the Soviet Government agreed to include in its draft treaty a provision prohibiting military aircraft and vessels capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction from leaving their national territories.

Thus in the Soviet draft there is no lack of measures specially designed really to avert the outbreak of a thermonuclear war, including some of the measures contained in the United States proposals on the prevention of war through accident, miscalculation, error and so forth.

But Mr. Stelle is wrong when he tries to build up his proof that the United States proposals for measures to avert the danger of war through accident coincide with proposals contained in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is far from being the case. The United States proposals, when taken out of the context of general and complete disarmament, cannot reduce the danger of an accidental outbreak of war, whereas the corresponding Soviet measures, being tied to the implementation of important disarmament measures envisaged for the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, would have a positive significance. This interdependence is not accidental. It derives from the very causes of the risk of war by miscalculation, failure of communication and so forth.

As long as the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament has not begun, and as long as the production of new and ever more devastating and rapidly effective means of mass destruction has not been stopped, the ground for the possibility of war by accident will remain.

It seems to us that Mr. Stelle, judging by his remarks on the lack of stability in the world in the conditions of the armaments race to which we referred earlier, understands this and realises what the world has to expect if the armaments race is not stopped.

At the present time, in a world saturated with atom and hydrogen bombs, one false move would suffice for a tornado of nuclear destruction to sweep over the earth. The only thing that could prevent such a catastrophe would be measures imposing specific obligations on States, measures leading to a real and not to an imaginary reduction of the danger of war.

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It cannot be doubted that the measures proposed by the United States are unlikely to prevent an outbreak of war through accident. Essentially changing nothing, such measures would only create the unjustified and very dangerous illusion that some sort of real obstacle to an outbreak of war had been created, whereas in reality the threat of a general war of annihilation being unleashed would continue to grow as before.

What result can be expected, for example, from a measure proposed by the United States for the prevention of war by accident such as advance notification of the launching of missiles -- about which General Burns spoke today (supra, p. 8), it seems -- or of the flights of strategic bombers or the movements of naval forces? That kind of measure in the conditions of an accelerated armaments race and intensive measures in preparing for war, cannot, of course, eliminate the risk of war through accident.

Furthermore, in the conditions of increasing international tension and the atmosphere of war psychosis, notification of the launching of missiles or the flights of bombers or the movements of naval forces cannot serve as a guarantee against surprise attack. On the contrary, such information could be used by the side planning aggression as a diversionary manœuvre or as a means for lulling and deceiving the intended victim of aggression, while the side supplying such information was preparing to deliver a surprise attack.

The possibility of matters taking such a turn is all the more likely since modern armed forces, with their means of waging war, particularly with their very considerable strategic means such as long and medium-range missiles, strategic bomber aircraft and the nuclear missile means of naval vessels, do not require much time for combat readiness. They are practically always in a state of combat readiness. Notification of such movements could in fact be used by a potential aggressor in order to conceal his preparation for delivering a surprise attack against a State or group of States chosen for that purpose and to divert attention from the direction of the main blow.

A thoroughly objective examination shows that the other measure proposed by the United States -- an exchange of military missions between General Staffs or groups of states -- can have no concrete value. In the conditions of an armaments race and intensive military preparations, with a wide network of foreign military bases in alien territories and provocative flights of aircraft with nuclear bombs, such a measure would be more likely to have harmful consequences. There is no doubt that in the present

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circumstances such missions would try to gather intelligence information on the defence system of the other country and its condition. An exchange of missions under these circumstances would only contribute to an increase of suspicion between States and would in no way contribute to a cessation of the armaments race. There is no guarantee that the activity of the military missions would not be used by the side planning aggression for the purpose of deception in order to camouflage the preparation of an attack. Only when there is a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that is, in a situation where a stop has been put to the armaments race and military preparations, will the measures indicated in the United States draft be justified and, possibly, have some significance. But what could really contribute to preventing the outbreak of war through accident would be the implementation of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union, such as the declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75).

We should like to stress once more that the removal of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons from foreign territories would reduce the danger of local or accidental conflicts being turned into a war with the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the presence of such weapons on foreign territories creates a situation in which any local conflict might rapidly develop into a general thermonuclear war.

An important role in reducing the risk of war through accident would also be played by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty as proposed by the Soviet Union. Of course, that measure, just as the draft declaration, has a completely independent significance. The creation of a more favourable international situation as the result of the conclusion of a pact and the introduction of the practice of consultation between the States parties to the non-aggression pact would undoubtedly contribute to a considerable extent to reducing the risk of war through accident.

It is obvious from what we have said that the Soviet Union is undoubtedly in favour of an agreement on measures which would really contribute to the prevention of war through accident. The Soviet Union is prepared to explore all ways and means that would make it possible to bring about a reduction of international tension.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

From that point of view the Soviet delegation is also ready to consider some of the proposals of the United States, for example, the proposal to establish a direct line of communication between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/70, pp.10-12). For all its inadequacy, that measure might have certain positive results. The Soviet Union is ready to agree immediately, without waiting for general and complete disarmament, to the establishment of a direct telephone or teletype communications line between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union is also willing to accept the United States proposal that each government should itself be responsible for the installation of such a line on its own territory and decide for itself the location of the terminal point of the line, in so far as its own end of the communication line is concerned. In other words, if the United States intends to install the end of such a channel at its National Command Center, we have no objection, since the Soviet Union will itself decide on the location of the end of the line on its own territory. Accordingly, each State must take the necessary steps to guarantee the transmission of information within the country to the government departments designated for that purpose. Of course each State will itself carry out the appropriate measures to ensure the permanent functioning of such a means of communication and to retransmit the information received. Periodic testing and verification of this means of communication could also be carried out. Of course, it will also be necessary to agree upon the direction and the place where the two terminal points of the communication line would be linked. We assume, however, that the solution of that problem will not meet with any difficulties which might hinder the achievement of an agreement.

Thus, as you see, the Soviet Union by no means takes the attitude of indiscriminately rejecting the measures proposed by the Western Powers for reducing international tension and, in particular, for preventing war through accident. I think that now the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, is satisfied. He has received an answer to the question in which he was so much interested, and which he touched upon in his statement today.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In that regard the attitude of the Soviet Union is really flexible and radically different from the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom, which either reject or avoid discussion of the Soviet proposals relating to collateral measures aimed at helping to improve the international situation and to reduce the risk of war. We assume, however, that in the future the Western delegations will adopt a more constructive attitude towards the Soviet proposals, and we hope that we shall reach agreement on them.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who has asked for five minutes in which to exercise the right of reply.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I have listened to the last part of what our Soviet colleague had to say with great interest and, in so far as it showed signs of bearing an olive branch, I can assure him that my delegation will study the verbatim record of his words very carefully. I do not intend now to go at any length into the various remarks which have been made by the representatives of the Eastern European States with regard to the speech made by Mr. Godber last Friday. I reserve the right to do that in detail at a later date. I wish simply to raise two or three points which I think ought not to be the subject of misunderstanding.

First of all, may I turn to what our Polish colleague said earlier this morning. He seemed to regard it as a matter for complaint against the Western delegations that when they were considering collateral measures they always examined them to see whether the principle of balance was or was not being upset. He seemed to regard that as something which was both unnecessary and almost unfair. I think my answer must be on these lines. He himself indicated that in his view partial measures -- and in this case I think he was trying to draw a distinction between those proposed by the Soviet Union and those proposed by the United States -- must be shown to be capable of contributing in themselves to disarmament. But if that is so, they must obviously be capable of being reconciled with the joint statement of agreed principles upon which the whole of our disarmament work -- whether it be on collateral measures or on general and complete disarmament -- is based, and that document expressly states (ENDC/5, para.5) that one of the basic principles must be the maintenance of the principle of balance between the two sides. Therefore, I make no apology for the fact that we do insist upon applying that principle; and, as far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, we shall continue to do so.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

The second point is that I think all of the Eastern European representatives who have spoken this morning have indicated that in fact the Soviet proposal (ENDC/75) on the renunciation of the use of bases on foreign territory would not alter the basic nuclear defensive positions. As Mr. Tsarapkin so often says, facts are facts, and it has not been possible to explain to me -- nor will it be possible, I am afraid, to convince me -- that the fact that, under the Soviet proposal, the bases on West European territory are to be withdrawn while the vast armoury of 700 medium-range ballistic missiles directed against the West European countries is to be left intact does not alter the balance between the two sides. Mr. Tsarapkin suggests that we ought to have faith that those weapons will not be used aggressively. Our Bulgarian colleague, as I understood him, very nearly went as far as to suggest that weapons -- whether nuclear or conventional -- were only aggressive when they were sited on foreign territories, and not otherwise. But I regret to say that those again are arguments which the West cannot accept.

In those circumstances, also, it is not possible for us to respond to the appeal from our Czechoslovakian colleague that we should disregard the facts of geography; the facts of geography are there, and they are facts which Mr. Tsarapkin and we alike must take into account. I suggest we have to take them into account especially when we ourselves are looking down the muzzles of the formidable weapons directed against us.

The third point I wish to make is simply that all our four Eastern European colleagues who have spoken this morning have accused Mr. Godber of being wrong and illogical in claiming that the adoption of more sophisticated and relatively more invulnerable weapon systems, such as Polaris, is a stabilizing factor in the situation of today. This is a very important point which I think we ought to discuss at length, because it is quite clear to me that a great deal of misconception exists in this Committee on the subject. I shall limit myself to just one very obvious and simple comment. If I happen to be aggressively-minded, I think I am less likely to carry out my evil intentions the more I realize that my potential victim possesses a weapon system so invulnerable as to render -- in words which Mr. Tsarapkin himself has used in the past -- my punishment sure and my retribution inescapable. In any case, I am credibly informed that the Soviet Government itself is doing all it can to render its own nuclear weapon system as invulnerable as possible, and I take it that that is not being done merely in order to carry out aggressive purposes.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Lastly, we have heard a great deal this morning again about the history of NATO and the merits or demerits of the German people, whether it be the West Germans or the East Germans. I shall not go into that at any length. All I wish to say is that if our Eastern European colleagues are so frightened about the alleged revanchist tendencies of the Federal German Republic, they ought to be thankful that the Federal German Republic is a member of NATO, and they ought to be the more thankful the more we can involve the Federal German Government in the work and in the obligations of that alliance, and thereby prevent any tendencies which our Eastern colleagues think it may have to "go it alone" and to use its own strength for its own nefarious purposes, as they are called. If the Federal German Government were indeed determined to act as is suggested, it would be much more dangerous if it were on its own. Moreover, if it were not involved with the rest of the Western alliance the chances of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be so much the greater.

Those are simply straightforward observations which I wanted to make at this stage. As I say, I reserve the right to go more fully on another occasion into points which have been made in the course of the debate.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The United States welcomes warmly the statement made by the Soviet representative this morning (supra, p. 52) that the Soviet Union is ready to consider favourably the United States proposal for the establishment of a direct communication link between our two Governments. As I listened to what Mr. Tsarapkin said about our proposal it appeared to me that his remarks fitted well with what we had proposed. We shall, of course, want to read the verbatim record of what he said, and my delegation will want to consult with his delegation informally and privately to hasten progress in what we believe will be an important development. I should like to welcome again the statement of the Soviet representative.

In view of the lateness of the hour my delegation will defer until another meeting any comments which it has to make upon other constructive and helpful statements made by some delegations this morning, as well as comments on statements which did not seem to us to be either helpful or constructive. But I must speak briefly about a telegram^{1/} from a Dr. Lothar Bolz, addressed to the co-Chairmen, which was read out by the Soviet representative, who asked on behalf of his delegation that it be made a Conference document. As far as the United States delegation is concerned the telegram

^{1/} Subsequently issued as document ENDC/81.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

is from a non-governmental organization and should be treated in accordance with the procedures governing such communications. We believe we have no obligation to sponsor the submission as a Conference document of this or any other of the many communications which we receive from individuals or non-governmental organizations, and we do not choose to join in the submission of this particular communication as a Conference document. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the submission by any delegation of any document as a Conference document under its own sponsorship. A similar communication was submitted to the Conference, as document ENDC/16, by the delegation of Czechoslovakia on 27 March 1962. We have no objection to the delegation of the Soviet Union following a comparable procedure, if it so wishes, this year.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): A few moments ago we heard the United Kingdom representative reply to a certain number of questions. I shall certainly not dwell upon them. I only want to say a few words on the last question he raised. Once again he plunged into a fierce defence of the position of Western Germany and its militarists. To reassure us he said in effect: "You see, now that Western Germany is with us you should not be afraid of it because we shall dominate it and not allow it to start a war". I would not like to linger over the point, particularly in view of what has already been said in our statement today (supra. pp.18 - 26), namely, that the Atlantic Alliance is hardly reassuring. But I recall the proverb: "Birds of a feather flock together"! And in the circumstances we are not at all easy in mind.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and eighteenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hassah, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Poland, Bulgaria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 8 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 2.10 p.m.